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In this paper, we investigate determinants of the welfare dependency among immigrants in an 
assimilation framework. The duration of stay is a major determinant of welfare dependency. 
Also, assimilation patterns vary substantially across immigrants from developed and less devel-
oped countries, respectively. The late arriving immigrants are relatively more dependent on 
transfers, explaining part of the general increase in welfare dependency during the latest years. 
This is partly attributed to the large variation in qualifications across cohorts of immigrants. Fur-
thermore, the business cycle effects of immigrants appear to be considerably larger than for na-
tives. 
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0 1  Introduction 
At the time of arrival, welfare dependency is observed to be substantially higher among immi-
grants than among natives in most host countries. However, it has been argued that it is the most 
able and motivated individuals who emigrate from their country of origin (e.g. Chiswick (1978) 
and Bell (1997)).
1 If this was the case, one would expect the welfare dependency to fall quickly 
upon arrival to the host country as the immigrants become more assimilated into the host-country 
labour market. However, in many countries the integration into the labour market seems to be 
inadequate, and Denmark is no exception. While the employment rate is around 76% for natives, 
it is 47% for immigrants from non-western countries (Schultz-Nielsen (2002)) and therefore the 
welfare dependency is still high after many years in Denmark.  
One explanation for this may be the “welfare magnet hypothesis” (Borjas (1999)). In coun-
tries with a high standard of living and a generous system of public transfers, low-income groups 
have high compensation rates. Hence, a special selection of immigrants is coming to these coun-
tries - both in terms of educational attainment and motivation in general. For Denmark this may 
very well be the case. For the tied-movers, mostly consisting of marriage migrants, the wish to 
live in a highly developed country may be one of the main reasons for involving in migration 
(Çelikaksoy et al. (2003)). For refugees, their emigration decisions are not considered voluntary, 
but the choice of where to apply for asylum may be influenced by the knowledge of the welfare 
systems in potential host countries. 
Based on the above considerations, the aim of the present paper is to analyze the extent and 
persistence of welfare dependency among immigrants in Denmark. We do this in an assimilation 
framework in order to identify the process of welfare dependency in the years following migra-
tion. In addition, we will test whether variations in the labour market conditions at the time of 
entry to Denmark and age at migration matter for welfare dependency assimilation of the immi-
grants. Furthermore, we explore whether the business cycle in general may have different im-
pacts on natives and immigrants, i.e. whether the immigrants tend to be more marginal labour 
than natives and therefore more dependent on transfers in downturns. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the Danish welfare system. 
Section 3 presents the testable hypotheses of the paper. Section 4 introduces the data used and 
relevant descriptive statistics. In Section 5 the econometric framework is outlined, Section 6 pre-
sents the results and finally Section 7 concludes. 
                                                           
1 On behalf of the self-selection process in emigration, Borjas (1987) argues that it need not be the case but that it 
depends on the income distribution in both host country and country of origin and their correlation. 
  12  Background, immigrants and the Danish welfare system 
Denmark is, along with the other Nordic countries, well known for being a fairly generous wel-
fare state. The Scandinavian welfare states are characterised by a large public sector and high 
levels of public income transfers, especially to unskilled workers and other low-income groups. 
Individuals can either be positive or negative net contributors to the welfare system. If individu-
als pay a larger amount in tax than they receive in public services and transfers, they are positive 
net contributors to the welfare state and vice versa. Generally, individuals in their working age 
are expected to be positive net contributors to the welfare state.  
Immigrants from non-western countries, however, tend to be negative net contributors to the 
welfare state, especially in the period immediately after migration. If immigrants become posi-
tive net contributors to the welfare state in the long run as they integrate into the host-country 
labour market, immigration can be looked upon as an “investment” with start-up costs (initial 
negative net contributions) and future pay-off (future positive net contributions). However, for 
this “investment” to be profitable, future pay-off needs to be positive; i.e. future public expenses 
on immigrants should be low. 
 
Figure 2.1. Fraction of GDP attributed to public income transfers along with the Danish 
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Note: Official Statistics, Statistics Denmark (1990, 1999) 
 
  2Public income transfers constitute a large proportion of public expenditure. Direct redistribution 
via cash-transfers from the public sector is of great importance in the Nordic countries, see Wa-
densjö and Örrje (2002). Figure 2.1 presents the fraction of Danish GDP that can be attributed to 
direct transfers to households along with the Danish unemployment rate during the period 1984-
1999. 
From Figure 2.1, it is seen that direct public income transfers account for between 16.3% 
and 21.2% of GDP in the period 1984-1999. Furthermore, it can be seen that the fraction of GDP 
attributed to direct transfers mimics the business cycle almost perfectly when the business cycle 
is described by the unemployment rate. 
However, the public income transfers differ with respect to both duration and entitlement 
and furthermore with respect to whether the transfers are means-tested or a fixed amount (the 
transfers can also be means-tested with respect to either individual income or household income). 
For instance, while everyone is entitled to public welfare of infinite duration, only individuals 
with earned entitlement are entitled to unemployment insurance benefits which are of limited 
duration. Appendix A1 describes in more detail the different transfer types which are included in 
the analysis in the present paper along with a description of whether the individual transfers re-
quire entitlements, have limited durations and/or whether they are means-tested. In general, in 
the Danish welfare state the universal principle applies. Hence, immigrants have the same rights 
as natives when it comes to receiving public income transfers, with a few exceptions.
2 First, im-
migrants coming to Denmark as a part of a family reunification are not entitled to social welfare 
if the family members who applied for family reunification signed a contract committing them to 
support their future reunified family members. However, if a “social event” (e.g. divorce, unem-
ployment or death of spouse) occurs to those family members who initially were in Denmark 
such that they no longer are able to support their reunified family members, the reunified family 
members become entitled to social welfare. If the immigrant who initially was in Denmark as a 
refugee, his future reunified family members are entitled to social welfare. Second, as a general 
rule, immigrants need to have been in Denmark for at least 10 years to receive early retirement 
pension and old-age pension (except for refugees and the early labour migrants). 
 
Welfare dependency among immigrants 
In this paper, we apply the concept of welfare dependency. Welfare dependency describes the 
fraction of household income that can be attributed to public income transfers. We refer to this as 
                                                           
2 See also Pedersen (2000) for a thorough examination of the different rules applying to natives and immigrants. 
  3the welfare dependency rate (see Section 4 for a discussion of the construction of this measure). 
Due to data limitations and definitions, we are not able to trace all transfers. Therefore, we focus 
on income-replacing transfers such as pensions, social welfare and unemployment insurance 
benefits. Furthermore, we include two other types of transfers, namely child benefits and public 
housing support (see Appendix A1 for exact definitions of the various transfers). Own calcula-
tions show that the sum of these transfers amounts to between 69% to 75% of the total amount of 
public income transfers to households in the period 1984-1999 as reported in official statistics 
(Statistics Denmark (1990, 1999)).
3 In the following, we will refer to income-replacing transfers, 
child benefits and public housing support as “public income transfers” despite the fact that they 
do not fully account for all transfers received by Danish households. 
 
Figure 2.2. Immigrants’ degree of over-representation among receivers of public in-
come transfers in relation to populations’ share, 1984-1999. 















































































Note: Own calculations. A degree of representation =1 corresponds to no over- or under-representation. 
 
                                                           
3 The fraction ranges from 75% (1993) to 69% (1999). The fact that it accounts for less than 100% is due to at least 
two things. First, some public income transfers are not traceable in our data, e.g. some types of childcare subsidies. 
Second, the numbers concerning the total expenditure on public income transfers are based on published statistics 
from Statistics Denmark, i.e. they are based on all individuals in Denmark. In contrast, own calculations describing 
the amount paid in income replacing transfers, child benefits and public housing support are calculated on the basis 
of individuals aged 18 and above in the data set used in the paper, i.e. a 10% sample of the Danish population (see 
also Section 4.1).  
  4An indicator of welfare dependency within a group of people in a society is the fraction of public 
income transfers received by the group compared to their relative population size. If the fraction 
of public income transfers received by the group exceeds its relative population size, it suggests 
relatively high welfare dependency of that group. Figure 2.2 presents the degree of over-
representation of immigrants from developed countries (DC)
4 and less developed countries 
(LDC) among receivers of public income transfers during the period 1984-1999.
5 A value =1 
corresponds to equal representation while a value >1 corresponds to over-representation. Figure 
2.2 reveals that 1
st generation immigrants – and especially from less developed countries – are 
highly overrepresented among the receivers of public income transfers, i.e. their fraction of pub-
lic income transfers exceeds their relative population size.
6 However, the degree of over-
representation seems to be fairly stable during the period 1984-1999 with a slight upward trend 
for immigrants from less developed countries. 
To investigate how the receiving of public income transfers is distributed within the popula-
tions of natives and immigrants from developed countries and less developed countries, respec-
tively, Figure 2.3 describes the distribution of the amounts received in public income transfers. 
                                                           
4 Throughout the paper, immigrants are split into two groups. The first group includes immigrants from developed 
countries (referred to as DC). The group of developed countries consists of the following countries: the Nordic coun-
tries, Other European countries, the Baltic countries, Russia, Ukraine, Georgia, Belarus, the USA, Canada, Japan, 
Australia and New Zealand. The second group includes immigrants from less developed countries (referred to as 
LDC) which contain all countries that are not included in the group of developed countries. 
5 For 1
st generation immigrants from developed countries, the relative population size has increased from 2.2% in 
1984 to 3.0% in 1999 while the relative population size of 1
st generation immigrants from less developed countries 
has increased from 0.8% in 1984 to 2.8% in 1999. In relative terms, the share of immigrants from developed coun-
tries in the total immigrant population has decreased from 73.2% in 1984 to 51.6% in 1999. 
6 Due to the differences in entitlement to various transfers, one would expect different “transfer patterns” among 
immigrants and natives. Since entitlement to e.g. unemployment insurance benefits (UIB) is related to a stable labour 
market attachment, one would expect fewer 1
st generation immigrants from less developed countries among receivers 
of UIB compared to e.g. social welfare where entitlement in general is universal. When focusing on social welfare 
only (including housing benefits), immigrants are even more overrepresented among the receivers. In 1999, 18.2% of 
social welfare transfers were received by 1
st generation immigrants from less developed countries despite the fact 
they made up only 2.8% of the Danish population. 1
st generation immigrants from less developed countries are also 
overrepresented among receivers of UIB but at a much smaller scale than for social welfare. In 1999, 3.6% of UIB 
were received by 1
st generation immigrants from less developed countries. This supports Pedersen (2000) and Borjas 
and Hilton (1996) who also find different patterns of welfare utilization among immigrants and natives. However, we 
will not focus on the “transfer mix” in our analysis. 
 
  5 
Figure 2.3. Distribution of the amounts received in public income transfers in 1989 and 
1999. 

















































Note: Kernel densities based on own calculations. The figure describes how the amounts of received public income transfers are distributed 
among households. 
 
Figure 2.3 shows that the majority of natives are concentrated with the lower part of the distribu-
tion while the opposite holds for immigrants from less developed countries. In fact, a large share 
of immigrants from less developed countries receive very large amounts in public income trans-
fers (> DKK 100,000). Immigrants from developed countries lie somewhere in between natives 
and immigrants from less developed countries. This clearly shows that the distribution of public 
  6income transfers is highly skewed to the right in the case of immigrants from less developed 
countries compared to natives and immigrants from developed countries. 
3  Testable hypotheses concerning immigrants’ welfare dependency 
In the previous sections, it has been illustrated how the welfare dependency in Denmark differs 
across natives and immigrants and also across immigrants from developed countries and less 
developed countries, respectively. In this section, we present the three specific hypotheses of the 
persistence of welfare dependency among immigrants. These hypotheses are tested empirically in 
Section 6. 
1) Assimilation profiles:  In the literature, the evidence of the nature of assimilation has been 
mixed. On one hand, it can be argued that when immigrants arrive to the host country, they are 
likely to depend on public income transfers in the period immediately after immigration until 
they become integrated into the host-country labour market and earn their own income. Hence, 
immigrants’ initial welfare dependency is likely to be high. If immigrants meet barriers of entry 
into the host-country labour market, the period of high welfare dependency will be relatively 
long. Depending on the strength of these barriers, assimilation out of welfare dependency is ex-
pected to take place as time since migration increases and the immigrants adapt to host-country 
society, norms etc. This hypothesis is confirmed in Hansen and Lofstrom (2003). On the other 
hand, if the migration decision is motivated by the generosity of the welfare system in the host 
country, the immigrant’s welfare dependency is likely to remain high, according to Borjas’ 
(1999) “welfare magnet hypothesis”. In fact, welfare dependency may even increase as time 
passes since these immigrants gain insight and entitlement to the welfare system of the host 
country. Furthermore, Borjas and Hilton (1996) argue that immigrants’ ethnic networks are used 
to gain insight into how the welfare system works, i.e. the types of welfare benefits received by 
earlier immigrant cohorts influence the take-up of welfare benefits among cohorts that arrived 
more recently. In that case, assimilation into welfare dependency takes place. This argument has 
also been put forward by e.g. Borjas (1999), Borjas and Hilton (1996), Riphahn (1999) and Bor-
jas and Trejo (1993). The mixed evidence on immigrant assimilation in welfare dependency 
leaves our a priori expectation about immigrants’ welfare dependency assimilation in Denmark 
an open question. In our empirical analysis, it will be analyzed whether immigrants assimilate 
into or out of welfare.  
  2) Business cycle effects: As unemployment incidence is highly correlated with welfare 
dependency, the state of the business cycles will affect the level of welfare dependency. During a 
recession, more individuals will experience higher welfare dependency as unemployment in-
  7creases and individuals with weak labour market attachment will be affected the most. Rosholm 
et al. (2001) and Blume et al. (2003) show that immigrants, and especially immigrants from less 
developed countries, have a weaker labour market attachment than natives. Nielsen (2002) found 
that welfare dependency is more sensitive to business cycle variation among immigrants than 
among natives and these results are confirmed in Barth et al. (2003). In order to investigate the 
business cycle effect on welfare dependency in a flexible manner, in our empirical analysis 
yearly indicator variables are included in the regression models and the estimated effects will 
show whether immigrants’ welfare dependency is more sensitive to the business cycle than na-
tives’ welfare dependency. 
3) Conditions at the time of arrival:  Prior research also suggests that conditions at the time 
of arrival influence the persistence of welfare dependency among immigrants (Nielsen (2002)). 
One of the most important factors is the age of the individual because acquiring host-country 
language abilities and adapting to new norms and a new culture is more difficult at a higher age. 
Hence, older immigrants are more likely to experience a high degree of welfare dependency. 
This is confirmed in e.g. Borjas and Hilton (1996) and Riphahn (1999). Another important factor 
is the labour market conditions at immigrants’ arrival.  According to e.g. Hansen and Lofstrom 
(2001), poor labour market conditions at the time of arrival may extend the period of high wel-
fare dependency, as labour market entry in the host country is likely to be postponed. In the em-
pirical part of this paper, both the age of the immigrants at immigration and the Danish unem-
ployment rate at immigration are included in order to identify such differences. 
4  Data 
4.1  Data source 
The empirical study in this paper is based on longitudinal data sets from Danish administrative 
registers supplied by Statistics Denmark to the Danish Institute of Local Government Studies 
(AKF). Throughout the paper, two different basic longitudinal data sets are used. The first data 
set is a 10% representative sample of the total Danish population (including immigrants) aged 15 
and above covering the period 1981-1999. However, for computational reasons a 10% sub-
sample of this data set in the period 1984-1999 is used in the analysis of welfare dependency 
among natives (31964 individuals and 324261 observations). Immigrants are excluded from this 
sub-sample. The second data set is a full population data set of the immigrant population in 
Denmark
7 aged 15 and above covering the period 1984-1999. All numbers and figures concern-
                                                           
7 For a further description of immigrants in Denmark and the data set, see e.g. Rosholm et al. (2001). 
  8ing immigrants are based on this data set. For computational reasons, the econometric analysis is 
restricted to a 10% sub-sample of 1
st generation immigrants. The period 1984-1999 is used in the 
analysis of welfare dependency among immigrants (23832 individuals and 177362 observations). 
For our purpose, the data sets are restricted to individuals aged 25-56 years in order to minimize 
biased results stemming from education and retirement. 
4.2  The income concept and income unit 
Throughout the paper, the household is treated as the income unit. However, the unit of analysis 
is the individual, i.e. the individual characteristics for individual i are the characteristics of the 
sampled individual in household j. 
The household income is defined as annual market income plus income transfers of the 
household members. Market income and income transfers (i.e. total income) include labour in-
come, income from capital and transfers but do not take the rental value of housing, free day care 
etc. into account. Income from children and other household members than the head of house-
hold and spouse is ignored. If the spouse is aged less than 25 or more than 56, their income and 
transfers are, despite the age restriction of the sampled individuals, used to calculate total house-
hold income and public income transfers and thereby the welfare dependency rate of individuals i 
in household j. 
Based on the description of the Danish welfare system, the transfers fall into two categories 
(see also Section 2): 
I)   Income replacing
 transfers (social welfare, unemployment insurance benefits, social 
pensions etc.) 
II)   Child benefits and public housing support. 
Appendix A1 describes the different elements of the public income transfers in more detail. 
In the literature, generally the measure of transfers studied has been the amounts of transfers re-
ceived by the unit of analysis studied. However, in this study we extend this approach to include 
the relative share of the total household income constituted by public transfers, i.e. the welfare 
dependency rate. This enables us to study, whether the degree of public support is changing over 
time, and hence whether the investment in integration yields a return in the long run. 
By using total income and the aggregate transfers, we define the following welfare de-









                                                                                                                                                                                     
 
  9for individual i=1,..,N belonging to household j=1,…,J at time t=1,…,T. The welfare dependency 
rate is the key variable in our analysis of welfare dependency. In order to analyze the welfare 
dependency rate, a number of explanatory variables are used.
4.3  Explanatory variables 
One of the key explanatory variables in the analysis is “year of entry into the Danish labour mar-
ket”. For immigrants, the year of entrance into the Danish labour market is defined as the immi-
gration year. For natives, the year of entrance is defined as the year they leave the educational 
system calculated as:  (current year - (age + education length +6)).  For immigrants, the year of 
entrance is used to calculate years since migration (YSM) and in the econometric analysis it is 
specified as a spline function. The spline specification consists of five variables. The first vari-
able describes years since migration. The other spline variables are number of years since migra-
tion exceeding 5, 10, 15 and 20 years, respectively. Based on the year of entrance, immigrant 
cohorts are also defined. The first cohort, ‘cohort 0’, entered the labour market prior to 1970. The 
other cohorts entered as follows: ‘cohort 1’: 1970-74, ‘cohort 2’: 1975-79, ‘cohort 3’: 1980-84, 
‘cohort 4’: 1985-89, ‘cohort 5’: 1990-1994 and finally ‘cohort 6’: 1995-1999.  
Educational variables are also included. First, an indicator for currently being enrolled at an 
education is defined. Second, a set of variables describing the educational level is defined. For 
both natives and immigrants, the level of Danish schooling is taken from the administrative reg-
isters while the level of immigrants’ home-country schooling is collected through a survey con-
ducted in 1999 among all immigrants who had a permanent residence permit in Denmark on 1
st 
January 1999. Due to the survey design, immigrants who acquired Danish schooling prior to 
1999 were not asked to participate in the survey. Among the immigrants who were asked to par-
ticipate in the survey around 50% did not respond. This may constitute a problem if the non-
respondents are not a random sample from the immigrant population. We choose to treat non-
respondents as a unique group. Of course, this may not fully solve the problem of endogeneity 
since education and non-response may be correlated. 
Based on this information, four educational variables are specified. The first variable is a 
continuous variable describing the number of years of Danish schooling. The second variable is a 
continuous variable describing the number of years of home-country schooling. The third vari-
able is an indicator variable equal to 1 if educational information is missing because the individ-
ual is not asked to participate in the survey. The last educational variable is an indicator variable 
equal to 1 if the individual was asked to participate in the survey but chose not to respond. For 
each observation, only one of these variables will be larger than 0. 
  10For natives, age is included as a spline function. The spline specification consists of five 
variables. The first variable is age and the four others are number of years by which age exceeds 
30, 35, 40 and 45, respectively. For immigrants, a variable describing age at migration is defined. 
It should be noted that Age = YSM + Age at migration. Therefore, all three variables cannot be 
included in the empirical analysis simultaneously. We include only YSM and age at migration. 
A variable describing number of kids in the household, an indicator for living in a “mixed” 
household
8 and a set of four indicators simultaneously defining both gender and civil status are 
included to capture differences in household composition. The variables simultaneously describ-
ing gender and civil status have cohabiting females as the excluded category. Furthermore, a few 
variables relating to the labour market are included. The first variable describes the proportion of 
the year spent as unemployed (the preceding year) at the individual level. The second variable 
describes the national unemployment rate at the year of entry into the Danish labour market. Fi-
nally, a set of indicators for the years 1985-1999 is included where the indicator for 1985 is the 
excluded category. 
To capture differences between immigrants from developed countries and less developed 
countries, the year-dummies unemployment at migration, age at migration and the YSM-
variables are interacted with the indicator for coming from a less developed country. Additional 
explanations along with descriptive statistics for the explanatory variables can be found in Ap-
pendix A2. 
4.4  Descriptive results 
In this section, we present descriptive measures concerning the amounts of transfers received and 
the welfare dependency rates among immigrants and natives in the period 1985-1999. Figure 4.1 
presents the average welfare measures in the period 1985-1999 for natives, immigrants from de-
veloped countries (DC) and immigrants from less developed countries (LDC).  
                                                           
8 A household is defined to be “mixed” if the two adults in the household are one immigrant and one native. 
  11 
Figure 4.1. Welfare dependency rates during the period 1985-1999. 
Natives and immigrants from developed countries (DC) and less developed countries (LDC). 




































































































  12 
Figure 4.2a. Amount of transfers received the period 1985-1999 for each cohort. 


















































































































































































Note: Own calculations. The welfare dependency rates are reported after the arrival period has ended, for instance the welfare dependency rates 
for cohort 4, who arrived during the period 1985-1989, are reported from 1990 and onwards. The welfare dependency rate is defined as the frac-
tion of personal income that can be attributed to public income transfers. 
  
  13 
Figure 4.2b. Welfare dependency rates during the period 1985-1999 for each cohort. 






















































































































































Note: Own calculations. The welfare dependency rates are reported after the arrival period has ended, for instance the welfare dependency rates 
for cohort 4, who arrived during the period 1985-1989, are reported from 1990 and onwards. The welfare dependency rate is defined as the frac-
tion of personal income that can be attributed to public income transfers. 
 
  14As it is evident from Figure 4.1, immigrants, and especially immigrants from less developed 
countries, receive more transfers and experience a higher welfare dependency rate than natives. 
Furthermore, welfare dependency has increased for immigrants in the period 1985-1999. Immi-
grants from developed countries have experienced an increase in the welfare dependency rate 
from 19% in 1985 to 27% in 1999 while immigrants from less developed countries have experi-
enced an increase from 37% to 49%. Part of the increase among immigrants from developed 
countries around 1995 and onwards is due to the large inflow of refugees from former Yugosla-
via during this period. Figure 4.1 also reflects the business cycle pattern. In Denmark, the busi-
ness cycles peaked in 1986 (with welfare dependency around 12%) and reached bottom in 1993 
(with welfare dependency around 18%). For immigrants, the large inflow of immigrants in the 
period 1985-1999 makes it difficult to determine what is business cycle variation and what is 
inflow of immigrants and thereby a change in the immigrant mix. The relation between business 
cycles and welfare dependency will be explored in more detail below. 
As pointed out in Section 3, immigrants may assimilate in or out of welfare dependency as 
years since migration increase. Figures 4.2a and 4.2b present welfare dependency for each cohort 
of natives, immigrants from developed countries and immigrants from less developed countries.  
The two figures for natives show that welfare dependency is fairly constant across cohorts 
during the period 1985-1999. However, it is worth mentioning that the late cohorts seem to be 
more sensible to business cycle variations than the early cohorts. This may reflect the relation 
between labour market attachment and impact of business cycle variation on welfare dependency 
as described in Section 3. 
 Concerning immigrants from developed countries, the middle parts of Figures 4.2a and 4.2b 
express some patterns of assimilation for this group of immigrants. The late cohorts experience a 
slightly higher welfare dependency than the earlier cohorts but with a decreasing trend. However, 
the pattern of assimilation in welfare dependency is most pronounced among immigrants from 
less developed countries who are presented in the bottom part of Figures 4.2a and 4.2b. As it can 
be seen, at the time of immigration the late cohorts of immigrants from less developed countries 
experience almost twice as large a welfare dependency rate than earlier cohorts who were 
already in the country.
 For instance, in 1990cohort 0 (i.e. immigrants who immigrated prior to 
1970) had a welfare dependency rate around 36% while cohort 4 (i.e. immigrants who immi-
grated between 1985 and 1989) had a welfare dependency rate around 64%. In the period follow-
ing migration, welfare dependency seems to fall remarkably, e.g. cohort 4 who experiences a fall 
in the welfare dependency rate from 64% in 1990 to 48% in 1999. 
  15As described in Section 3, immigrants’ age at migration may have an impact on their welfare 
dependency. Table 4.1 describes the welfare dependency rate in 1990 and 1999 among immi-
grants with different ages at immigration. 
 
Table 4.1. Immigrants’ welfare dependency rates and amount of transfers received in 
1990 and 1999 distributed by age at immigration. 
Immigrants from developed countries (DC) and less developed countries (LDC). 
 
     
 
Immigrants from developed  
countries (DC) 
Immigrants from less developed  
countries (LDC) 
  Year Year Year Year 
  1990 1999 1990 1999 
      
Age at immigration:  --- Amount of transfers received in DKK --- 
Aged <20  53911.1  47576.2  111492.7  89599.2 
Aged 20-35  43986.8  48130.1  92649.9  100161.9 
Aged >35  41245.0  73045.5  101738.3  119891.9 
      
 ---Welfare dependency rate --- 
Aged <20  0.29  0.25  0.48  0.46 
Aged 20-35  0.26  0.26  0.55  0.50 
Aged >35  0.30  0.41  0.64  0.64 
Note: Own calculations. Only calculated for immigrants where time of immigration is known/registered. The welfare dependency rate is 
defined as the fraction of personal income that can be attributed to public income transfers. 
 
As it can be seen in Table 4.1, the general tendency is that immigrants from less developed coun-
tries who immigrated at older ages experience higher welfare dependency rates than immigrants 
who immigrated at younger ages. During the period 1990-1999, the differences in welfare de-
pendency between immigrants from less developed countries who immigrated at different ages 
have become significant. In 1999, immigrants from less developed countries aged more than 35 
at migration experienced a welfare dependency rate of 64% compared to 46% for immigrants 
from less developed countries aged less than 20 at migration. These results suggest that age at 
migration is an important determinant of welfare dependency - especially among immigrants 
from less developed countries. These descriptive results are in line with the findings of Borjas 
and Hilton (1996) and Riphahn (1999). 
Due to the close link between unemployment and welfare dependency, the current unem-
ployment rate is expected to have an impact on welfare dependency. Table 4.2 contains informa-
tion about welfare dependency during the period 1985-1999 distributed by years where the un-
employment rate is either low (<8%), medium (8-10%) or high (>10%).  
  16Table 4.2. Welfare dependency rates and amount of transfers received in 1985-1999 
distributed by the current unemployment rate. 
Natives and immigrants from developed countries (DC) and less developed countries (LDC).
 
           
  Natives 
Immigrants from  
developed  
countries (DC) 
Immigrants from  
less developed  
countries (LDC) 
            
Current unemployment 
rate:  --- Amount of transfers received in DKK --- 
Low  (<8%)    30324.6    46811.6    94925.9  
Medium  (8-10%)    32048.4    43392.6    94701.8  
High  (>10%)    37480.9    47316.5    106360.9  
            
  ---------- Welfare dependency --------- 
Low  (<8%)   0.14    0.25    0.48   
Medium  (8-10%)   0.15    0.24    0.50   
High  (>10%)   0.17    0.26    0.56   
           
Note: Own calculations. Based on a pooled sample of all observations in the period 1985-1999. The welfare dependency rate is defined as the
fraction of personal income that can be attributed to public income transfers. 
 
Table 4.2 illustrates that welfare dependency for natives and immigrants from developed coun-
tries increases with the national unemployment rate but also that it is only slightly sensitive to 
variations in the unemployment rate. Going from a period of low unemployment to a period of 
high unemployment only increases welfare dependency by 1-3 percentage points. However, for 
immigrants from less developed countries, welfare dependency is more sensitive to variations in 
the unemployment rate as the difference in welfare dependency rates between a period of low 
unemployment and a period of high unemployment is around 8 percentage points. 
As pointed out in Section 3, not only the current unemployment rate, but also the host-
country unemployment rate at immigration may affect long-run welfare dependency. Table 4.3 
describes welfare dependency among natives and immigrants who immigrated when the Danish 
unemployment rate was either low (<8%), medium (8-10%) or high (>10%). 
Table 4.3 shows that the unemployment rate at the time of entry to the labour market does 
not have a persistent impact on welfare dependency for natives but indeed it does for immigrants, 
especially in 1999. Immigrants who entered in periods with medium or high unemployment have 
experienced higher welfare dependency than immigrants who entered in periods with low unem-
ployment. In 1999, immigrants from less developed countries who entered in periods with high 
unemployment experienced a welfare dependency rate which was 8 percentage points higher 
when compared to those who entered in periods with low unemployment. In 1999, immigrants 
from developed countries who entered in periods with high unemployment experienced a welfare 
dependency rate which was 13 percentage points higher when compared to those who entered in 
  17periods with low unemployment. This indicates that the initial labour market conditions do have 
an impact on long-run welfare dependency for immigrants. For natives, the impact seems to be of 
minor importance.  
 
Table 4.3. Welfare dependency rates and amount of transfers received in 1990 and 1999 
distributed by the unemployment rate at entry. 
Natives and immigrants from developed countries (DC) and less developed countries (LDC).
 
        
  Natives 
Immigrants from  
developed  
countries (DC) 
Immigrants from  
less developed  
countries (LDC) 














        
   
Unemployment rate 
at the year of entry:  --- Amount of transfers received in DKK --- 
Low (<8%)  33046.0  31436.2  45092.3  38203.0  101868.0  90935.1 
Medium  (8-10%)  32105.8 32386.0 44319.9 55245.2 89551.8  102230.2 
High  (>10%)  30065.2 27927.9 43273.7 66962.3 87149.4  109649.1 
        
  ---------- Welfare dependency rate --------- 
Low  (<8%)  0.16 0.14 0.25 0.22 0.52 0.46 
Medium  (8-10%)  0.15 0.14 0.31 0.29 0.60 0.50 
High  (>10%)  0.15 0.13 0.27 0.35 0.52 0.54 
        
NOTE: Own calculations. For natives, the year of entry is defined to be when they leave the educational system. For immigrants, the year of entry
is defined to be the time of immigration. For immigrants, the numbers are based on immigrants where time of immigration is known/registered.
The welfare dependency rate is defined as the fraction of personal income that can be attributed to public income transfers. 
 
5  Econometric specification 
In order to study the determinants of welfare dependency rate we estimate two types of tobit 
models, namely a one-limit tobit in the case of the amount of transfers (a continuous variable 
censored from below at 0) and a two-limit tobit model for the welfare dependency rate (which is 
a continuous variable censored from below at 0 and from above at 1). In the most general case, 
the two-limit case, the model can be formulated as 
 
*
it it i it yx v β ε = ++ (1) 
where is the latent (uncensored) variable for individual i at time t,
*
it y it x is the matrix of individual 
characteristics, i ν  individual, time-invariant specific effect and it ε an idiosyncratic error term. The 
censoring of the dependent variable (the welfare dependency rate) results in the following ob-
served dependent variable: 





















U refers to the group of uncensored individuals, whereas L and R refer to the groups of left- and 
right-censored observations, respectively. As the data set is a panel data set, with up to 15 obser-
vations per individual, the model is specified as a random effects tobit model, assuming 
that
2 (0, ) i N ν ν σ ∼ . 
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In the one-limit case, the last term of F(.) drops out. The model is estimated by maximum likeli-
hood
9 and the results from the estimation are presented below. 
6  Results  
In this section, we present the results from the estimation of the model described in Section 5. 
The models are estimated separately by gender and for natives and immigrants, respectively. 
After presenting the estimates, we focus on the assimilation patterns for immigrants, as well as 
the business cycle effects (represented by year indicators in the model). 
                                                           
9 The model is estimated by the use of Stata, approximating the integral in (3) with a 4-point Gauss-Hermite quadra-
ture. 
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6.1  Estimates from two-limit tobit 
In Table 6.1, the results for the models estimated with WDR as the dependent variable are pre-
sented (see Appendix for models with levels of welfare as the dependent variables). The models 
are estimated separately by gender, mainly because the family status variables affect men and 
women significantly different.  The results show that for all groups, singles have a higher degree 
of welfare dependency than cohabiting/married individuals. If a native individual is part of a 
mixed household, i.e. is cohabiting/married to an immigrant, the welfare dependency of the 
household, and hence the individual, increases. This is also the case for immigrants from devel-
oped countries whereas the opposite is the case for immigrants from less developed countries. 
The latter is no surprise because this is simply the mirror picture of the results for native Danes. 
As child benefits are included in this measure for welfare dependency, the number of kids in the 
household increases the welfare dependency for all groups of women and for men from LDC.   
The individual degree of unemployment in the preceding year is included in the model as 
a proxy for current employment status. Having been fully employed in the previous year reduces 
welfare dependency with between 11 and 37 percentage points compared to an individual who was 
fully unemployed (depending on which group is considered). Furthermore, the estimated time indi-
cators show that there is a clear business cycle effect in the welfare dependency. The business cycle 
effect will be described and illustrated in more detail below. 
As expected from the descriptive statistics, WDR depends on the country of origin. It ap-
pears that for immigrants belonging to EC12 the WDR is significantly lower than for the Nordic 
countries (reference category), whereas Ex-Yugoslavian immigrants have a significantly higher 
WDR. In the case of immigrants from less developed countries, the Iranian and Iraqi immigrants 
have the highest WDR (Turkey is the reference category). However, not only the country of ori-
gin is an important determinant of the WDR, also the time of arrival. Therefore, arrival cohort 
indicators are included in the regressions as well. For women from developed countries and 
males from less developed countries, the 1990s’ cohort (the reference category) is doing better in 
the sense that they are less dependent on welfare than the previous cohorts. However, for women 
from LDC’s and men from DC’s that is not the case, as the previous cohorts are less dependent 
on welfare. Table 6.1. Estimation results from estimation of Two-Limit Tobit Model. 
Natives and immigrants aged 25-57. 
Dependent variable: Welfare dependency rate (WDR) 
 
  Females  Males 
  Natives 
Immigrants from developed 
countries (DC) 
Immigrants from less  
developed countries (LDC) Natives 
Immigrants from developed 
countries (DC) 
Immigrants from less  
developed countries (LDC) 
  Coef.   Std.err.  Coef.  Std.err.  Coef.  Std.err.  Coef.  Std.err.  Coef.  Std.err.  Coef.  Std.err. 
D1986  -0.0164 **  0.0030  -0.0175**  0.0043 -0.0502** 0.0072 -0.0286**  0.0045 -0.0260** 0.0065 -0.0059   0.0068 
D1987  0.0279 **  0.0030  0.0420**  0.0043 0.0383** 0.0071 -0.0028   0.0045 -0.0006   0.0065 0.0534**  0.0066 
D1988  0.0464 **  0.0030  0.0689**  0.0043 0.0786** 0.0071 0.0032   0.0046 0.0239** 0.0066 0.0706**  0.0065 
D1989  0.0594 **  0.0030  0.0856**  0.0043 0.0986** 0.0072 0.0165**  0.0046 0.0424** 0.0066 0.0948**  0.0065 
D1990  0.0620 **  0.0030  0.0889**  0.0043 0.1187** 0.0073 0.0191**  0.0046 0.0449** 0.0067 0.1030**  0.0065 
D1991  0.0694 **  0.0030  0.0913**  0.0044 0.1087** 0.0075 0.0416**  0.0046 0.0626** 0.0068 0.1275**  0.0066 
D1992  0.0856 **  0.0030  0.1113**  0.0044 0.1363** 0.0078 0.0569**  0.0047 0.0863** 0.0069 0.1533**  0.0067 
D1993  0.0950 **  0.0030  0.1180**  0.0045 0.1579** 0.0081 0.0674**  0.0047 0.0986** 0.0070 0.1761**  0.0069 
D1994  0.0841 **  0.0030  0.1133**  0.0046 0.1402** 0.0085 0.0479**  0.0048 0.0770** 0.0072 0.1664**  0.0071 
D1995  0.0794 **  0.0031  0.0975**  0.0047 0.1032** 0.0089 0.0452**  0.0049 0.0682** 0.0074 0.1298**  0.0073 
D1996  0.0807 **  0.0031  0.1179**  0.0047 0.1122** 0.0093 0.0500**  0.0050 0.1019** 0.0075 0.1391**  0.0076 
D1997  0.0760 **  0.0031  0.0986**  0.0049 0.0998** 0.0098 0.0562**  0.0050 0.0818** 0.0077 0.1301**  0.0079 
D1998  0.0580 **  0.0032  0.0660**  0.0050 0.0654** 0.0103 0.0402**  0.0052 0.0292** 0.0081 0.0758**  0.0082 
D1999  0.0515 **  0.0032  0.0575**  0.0052 0.0752** 0.0107 0.0224**  0.0053 0.0081   0.0085 0.0966**  0.0085 
Single  0.1298 **  0.0017  0.1449**  0.0033 0.1277** 0.0038 0.0618**  0.0027 0.1168** 0.0054 0.0268**  0.0031 
No. of Kids  0.0548 **  0.0008  0.0613**  0.0011 0.0340** 0.0011 -0.0110**  0.0014 -0.0048** 0.0019 0.0050**  0.0010 
Mixed Househ.  0.0174 **  0.0050  0.0041   0.0031 -0.2174** 0.0051 0.0618**  0.0109 0.0250** 0.0059 -0.1855**  0.0044 
Individual U  0.0246 **  0.0003  0.0228**  0.0003 0.0117** 0.0004 0.0370**  0.0005 0.0341** 0.0005 0.0206**  0.0003 
Ongoing Educ.  0.1063 **  0.0030  0.0670**  0.0043 -0.0072   0.0060 0.1678**  0.0054 0.1214** 0.0073 0.0439**  0.0045 
EC12             
           
           
           
           
           
           
  -0.0059**  0.0028     -0.0631** 0.0075  
Ex-Yugoslavia    0.4437**  0.0050     0.4080** 0.0097  
Other DC    0.0156**  0.0032     0.0696** 0.0091  
Pakistan      0.0469** 0.0111     -0.0332**  0.0080 
Vietnam      0.1245** 0.0085     0.0658**  0.0109 
Iran      0.2656** 0.0092     0.2655**  0.0078 
Iraq      0.2993** 0.0099     0.2617**  0.0084 
21 22
           
           
     
     
     
     
     
     
           
           
           
           
           
     
     
     
     
     
     
No State      0.2857** 0.0105     0.2196**  0.0078 
Other LDC      0.0104   0.0067     0.0028   0.0056 
Cohort 1970s    0.0612**  0.0079 -0.0611** 0.0140   0.0133   0.0185 0.0402**  0.0131 
Cohort 1980s    0.0236**  0.0050 -0.0559** 0.0073   -0.0380** 0.0094 0.0053   0.0070 
Educ Danish  -0.0100 **  0.0002  -0.0113**  0.0005 -0.0191** 0.0008 -0.0332**  0.0006 -0.0355** 0.0013 -0.0285**  0.0008 
Educ home    -0.0110**  0.0005 -0.0120** 0.0007   -0.0353** 0.0012 -0.0207**  0.0008 
No response    -0.1087**  0.0071 -0.0767** 0.0080   -0.3715** 0.0168 -0.2104**  0.0101 
Not asked    -0.0946**  0.0077 -0.0571** 0.0086   -0.3523** 0.0174 -0.2060**  0.0103 
U at entry  -0.0017 **  0.0003  0.0041**  0.0008 -0.0006   0.0013 -0.0094**  0.0008 0.0040*  0.0022 0.0063**  0.0013 
Age at immig.    -0.0063**  0.0023 0.0181** 0.0026   0.0006   0.0037 0.0040   0.0028 
Age  -0.0899 **  0.0063      -0.0906**  0.0096    
Age30+  0.0440 **  0.0100      0.0005   0.0153    
Age35+  0.0474 **  0.0092      0.0274*  0.0148    
Age40+  -0.0319 **  0.0089      -0.0274*  0.0146    
Age45+  0.0546 **  0.0070      0.1560**  0.0114    
YSM missing    -0.0874**  0.0106 -0.2435** 0.0160   -0.1684** 0.0229 -0.2839**  0.0148 
YSM    -0.1413**  0.0114 -0.1010** 0.0122   -0.1933** 0.0161 -0.4886**  0.0122 
YSM5+    0.0962**  0.0167 -0.0082   0.0165   0.0952** 0.0234 0.3182**  0.0169 
YSM10+    0.0110   0.0148 0.0859** 0.0147   0.0316   0.0214 0.0986**  0.0152 
YSM15+    0.0151   0.0158 0.0408** 0.0170   0.0065   0.0237 0.0037   0.0184 
YSM20+    0.0553**  0.0175 -0.0067   0.0206   0.0669** 0.0274 0.0756**  0.0229 
Constant  0.4657 **  0.0182  0.2261**  0.0136 0.4972** 0.0189 0.7019**  0.0289 0.4535** 0.0349 0.7165**  0.0192 
σu 0.2438   0.0009  0.2760  0.0010 0.2256  0.0012 0.2645  0.0011 0.3306  0.0016 0.2428  0.0012 
σe 0.1913   0.0004  0.2510  0.0006 0.2707  0.0007 0.2700  0.0008 0.3349  0.0010 0.3123  0.0007 
ρ  0.6189   0.0019  0.5473  0.0020 0.4099  0.0028 0.4898  0.0021 0.4935  0.0023 0.3768  0.0024 
Log L  -11931.6     -48296.8    -35763.1    -60021.7    -71685.0    -68509.6   
N  158777     144660    104183    165484    137597    143290   
Left-censored  39479     33968    7352    85172    59775    22420   
Right-censored  3017     8496    10260    3673    7681    10719   
NOTE: ** indicates significance at a 5% level and * at a 10% level. 
 For all groups, the length of completed Danish education has a negative impact on the degree of 
welfare dependency and the effects for immigrants are of the same size as that of Danes. How-
ever, for women one additional year of Danish education reduces the welfare dependency rate by 
about 1 percentage point, whereas it is around 3% for males. Also education acquired in the 
country of origin reduces welfare dependency and the estimates are roughly the same as in the 
case of Danish education. This suggests that education acquired in the country of origin matters 
for the success of the immigrant in the Danish labour market and is close to being perfectly trans-
ferable across international borders.
10 The general results concerning the impact of education on 
welfare dependency are in contrast to Riphahn (1999) who finds that an increased level of 
schooling increases welfare dependency. However, Blume (2003) finds that the level of both 
Danish and home-country schooling has a positive impact on immigrants’ wages in the Danish 
labour market which suggests that schooling in general has a positive impact on immigrants’ 
performance in Denmark. 
Generally, the Danish unemployment rate at the time of entry to the Danish labour market 
has only a very limited (though significant) impact on welfare dependency and the direction of 
the effects varies across groups of individuals.  
Age at the time of immigration has only a small impact and only for females it is statisti-
cally significant. However, the estimated effect for DC women is negative, whereas it is positive 
and three times larger in the case of LDC women. Age of the individual is included as a linear 
spline function.
11 This means that the variables enter in a cumulative way.
12 For instance native 
women aged 25-30 have a coefficient of (-0.0899) while those aged 30-35 have a coefficient of (-
0.0899) + (0.0440)=(-0.0351), etc. It is seen that age generally increases welfare dependency 
until the age of 45, but from that point age has a positive impact. This confirms to some extent 
the descriptive results from Section 4.4 indicating a lower level of welfare dependency as time 
since labour market entry increases – at least up to the age where retirement approaches.  
The results regarding the duration of stay in Denmark confirm the descriptive results pre-
sented in Section 4.4. For immigrants, years since migration, included as a linear spline function, 
generally reduce welfare dependency indicating assimilation out of welfare dependency.  Only in 
the case of immigrants from LDCs having stayed in Denmark for more than 20 years there is a 
                                                           
10 This contrasts general results from the literature, see e.g. Friedberg (2000) for the Israeli labour market and Blume 
(2003) for the case of Denmark.  
11 The age variable is included for natives. It is highly correlated with years since migration and therefore only age at 
the time of immigration is included for immigrants.  
12 The same holds for years since migration (YSM) in the case of immigrants. 
23 positive effect of around 2.5% per additional year since migration. This result is in line with Han-
sen and Lofstrom (2003) who find a similar result for immigrants in Sweden.  
The constants of the estimated models vary substantially across the groups considered and 
the effect of that becomes clear when studying the assimilation profiles in the next section. 
6.2  Welfare dependency assimilation process 
In order to explore the welfare dependency assimilation process of immigrants in more detail, the 
estimated models for the welfare dependency rate presented in Table 6.1 are used to calculate 
predicted assimilation profiles. The predicted welfare dependency rate   WDR is calculated as the 
latent variable
*
t tt yx β ′ = presented in Expression (2) in Section 5. The vector of characteristics, t x , 
is defined for a “standard person”. The characteristics of the standard persons are defined by the 
mean values for the explanatory variables in the relevant sub-samples (i.e. natives, immigrants 
from developed countries and immigrants from less developed countries) with a few exceptions, 
however. The standard persons are not living in mixed households. Furthermore, unless else is 
specified the standard immigrant from developed countries has 12.8 years of home-country 
schooling while the standard immigrant from less developed countries has 11.4 years of home-
country schooling.
13 The assimilation profiles are calculated for a person who immigrated at the 
age of 25 and who is living in Denmark during the next 25 years until the age of 50. For natives, 
the process of assimilation in welfare dependency process is determined by age while it is deter-
mined by years since migration along with its interactions for immigrants. 
The predicted assimilation profiles for these standard persons are presented in Figure 6.1. 
The predicted assimilation profile for natives is included for the purpose of comparison. 
Male immigrants from less developed countries initially experience a very high welfare de-
pendency rate (80%) compared to male immigrants from developed countries (10%) and natives 
(10%). However, male immigrants from less developed countries tend to assimilate faster out of 
welfare dependency than immigrants from developed countries, though never reaching a level 
lower than 43%. It is clear from the figure that welfare dependency of immigrants from less de-
veloped countries decreases relatively fast and after approximately 15 years it stabilizes at a level 
of welfare dependency around 43%. This level of welfare dependency is, however, considered to 
be a rather high level. Despite the unambiguous assimilation out of welfare dependency for male 
                                                           
13 These values are the mean values for immigrants from developed countries and less developed countries calcu-
lated on the basis of those immigrants from developed countries and less developed countries who have a positive 
number of years of home-country schooling, respectively. 
  24immigrants from both developed countries and less developed countries, the low level of welfare 
dependency for natives is  only reached in the case of DC immigrants.  
 
Figure 6.1. Predicted assimilation profiles for welfare dependency. 
















































































































Note: The assimilation profiles are calculated for standard persons during the age period 25-57 who do not live in mixed households and who are 
not single. Immigrants are a weighted average of the different countries of origin and belong to cohort 1970. Immigrants from DC are assumed to 
have the mean value of home-country schooling (calculated on the basis of immigrants from DC with number of years of home-country schooling 
greater than 0) and correspondingly for immigrants from LDC. In all other respects, the standard persons have got the mean values of the explana-
tory variables as individual characteristics. 
 
In the case of females, the levels of the predicted WDR are relatively high for all groups and the 
assimilation profile is more flat than for males. An implication of this is that the levels of welfare 
  25dependency remain relatively high.  The finding that immigrants assimilate out of welfare is in 
line with Hansen and Lofstrom (2003) who find a similar result for immigrants in Sweden. How-
ever, the results are in contrast to Borjas and Trejo (1993), Baker and Benjamin (1995), Borjas 
and Hilton (1996) and Riphahn (1999) who all find that immigrants assimilate into welfare. It 
should be noted that the applied concept of transfers here is broader than the concepts generally 
applied in these analyses. However, the fact that our data suggest that immigrants assimilate out 
of welfare dependency seems to be a fairly robust result.
14 It can therefore be concluded that 
Denmark is not a true “welfare magnet” in the sense that immigrants start out with initially high 
welfare dependency and then furthermore assimilate into welfare dependency as they gain insight 
into the Danish welfare system. Our results do not point in that direction.  
For immigrants to be a “profitable investment” for the society in the long run, their welfare 
dependency needs to be relatively low in the years when they are supposed to be net-contributors 
to the welfare state, i.e. primarily the age 25-50. However, Figure 6.1 suggests an initially very 
high level of welfare dependency in the period following immigration and the predicted welfare 
dependency remains at a high level in the case of most immigrant groups. This implies that im-
migrants’ age at the time of arrival may be crucial with respect to whether immigrants are a 
“profitable investment” for the Danish society. To explore this in more detail, additional immi-
grant standard persons have been constructed having different ages at the entry to Denmark 
(namely 15, 25, 35 or 45 years). All these standard persons are assumed to have brought 7 years 
of home-country schooling and not to have acquired any Danish schooling.
15 Figure 6.2 de-
scribes assimilation in welfare dependency for immigrants from developed countries and less 
developed countries when the different standard persons with varying age at immigration are 
applied.  
The upper parts of Figures 6.2 (a and b) show that the patterns of assimilation in welfare de-
pendency do not diverge much between the immigrants from developed countries. All males tend 
to assimilate towards a level around 20% within 15 years. For immigrants from less developed 
countries, the assimilation patterns for the different standard persons are also very similar, 
though they never approach as low a level as is the case for DC  immigrants. These results are 
                                                           
14 A part of the analysis has also been carried out with a narrower concept of public income transfers. Narrowing the 
concept of public income transfers had no effect on the conclusions drawn.  
15 The reason why the level of schoolings is changed compared to the standard persons applied above is due to the 
fact that immigrants who immigrated at the age of 15 could not have brought more than seven years of schooling. To 
isolate the pure effect of age at migration other variables remain the same for the applied standard persons.  
 
  26confirmed in the female case, though again, the female levels are generally higher than the male 
levels.  
 
Figure 6.2a. Welfare dependency assimilation profiles for male immigrants with varying 
age at entry. 
Immigrants from developed countries (DC) and less developed countries (LDC). 
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Note: The assimilation profiles are calculated for standard persons during the age period 25-57 who do not live in mixed households and who are 
not single. Immigrants are a weighted average of the different countries of origin and belong to cohort 1970. Immigrants are assumed to have 
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Figure 6.2b. Welfare dependency assimilation profiles for female immigrants with vary-
ing age at entry. 
Immigrants from developed countries (DC) and less developed countries (LDC). 
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Note: The assimilation profiles are calculated for standard persons during the age period 25-57 who do not live in mixed households and who are 
not single. Immigrants are a weighted average of the different countries of origin and belong to cohort 1970. Immigrants are assumed to have 




Based on this, it can be concluded that the chance for immigrants to be a “profitable” investment 
for society is reduced as the age at immigration increases. These results are in line with Borjas 
and Hilton (1996) and Riphahn (1999) who find that a high age at immigration increases welfare 
dependency. This may be explained by better knowledge of Danish language and culture among 
  28the immigrants who immigrate at young ages. However, especially for immigrants from less de-
veloped countries the welfare dependency is, despite its stabilizing pattern, always at a relatively 
high level.  
 
6.3 Welfare dependency and the business cycle 
All models for both immigrants and natives are estimated with year dummies in order to capture 
year-specific effects, which can be interpreted as business cycle effects and other effects that 
influence the welfare dependency, see Barth et al. (2003). To illustrate the impact from the busi-
ness cycle, predicted welfare dependency rates,  WDR , are calculated for the standard persons 
described above in each of the years 1985-1999. The only variables allowed to vary are the year 
dummies and their interactions while age and years since migration are not changed in order to 
capture the pure effect. Based on the predicted value of the welfare dependency rate in year 
t, , we calculate     () WDR t













for the three standard persons, i.e. natives, immigrants from developed countries and immigrants 
from less developed countries. The results from the calculations are presented in Figure 6.3.  
Figure 6.3 shows that for native males the predicted welfare dependency rates have a 
slightly increasing trend during the period 1985-1999. For immigrants the upward trends is more 
significant until around 1994 where it peaks and starts a downward trend. Part of the upward 
trend for immigrants from developed countries until 1994 is probably due to the large inflow of 
refugees from former Yugoslavia who immigrated to Denmark during this period. Generally, it is 
remarkable that the predicted welfare dependency rate for immigrants – and especially immi-
grants from less developed countries – generally expresses more volatility than for natives and 
that both maximum and minimum deviations from the mean are remarkably larger than for na-
tives. These results are in line with Barth et al. (2003). For women similar patterns emerge 
though the difference between natives and immigrants tends to be smaller. 
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Figure 6.3. The impact from business cycle variation on predicted welfare dependency 
during 1985-1999. 


















































































































































Note: Each year during 1985-1999, the predicted welfare dependency rate is calculated for standard persons aged 25 who do not live in mixed 
households and who are not single. Immigrants are a weighted average of the different countries of origin . The standard immigrants from DCs 
and LDCs have just immigrated. I all other respects, the standard persons have got the mean values of the explanatory variables as individual 
characteristics. 
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7  Conclusion 
In line with results from Sweden, but in contrast to results from Germany and the US, we find 
that 1
st generation immigrants assimilate out of welfare dependency in Denmark. 
The descriptive results suggested that 1
st generation immigrants, and especially immigrants 
from less developed countries, are overrepresented among the receivers of public income trans-
fers when compared to natives. Furthermore, their overrepresentation has been increasing during 
the period 1984-1999. The descriptive results also indicated that a high age at immigration and a 
high unemployment rate at immigrants’ arrival increase welfare dependency. The descriptive 
results are almost fully confirmed when estimating models for welfare dependency for natives 
and 1
st generation immigrants aged 25-57 in the period 1985-1999.  
Comparing natives and immigrants, a remarkable result is that living in a mixed household 
(i.e. the two adults in a household consist of one native and one immigrant) reduces welfare de-
pendency for immigrants while it increases welfare dependency for natives. This suggests that 
immigrants who cohabit with a native may be able to utilize the native’s social network to obtain 
employment and thereby reduce welfare dependency considerably. In general, the level of 
schooling reduces welfare dependency among immigrants from both developed countries and 
less developed countries. Actually, home-country schooling seems to be close to fully transfer-
able to the Danish labour market which is in contrast to results from previous research from other 
countries on this topic.  
Immigrants from less developed countries experience much higher welfare dependency  than 
immigrants from developed countries. Welfare dependency among immigrants from less devel-
oped countries is also far more sensitive to variations in the current unemployment rate suggest-
ing that immigrants from less developed countries have a more marginal labour force attachment 
than natives and immigrants from developed countries. However, despite a very high level of 
welfare dependency, immigrants from less developed countries assimilate out of welfare depend-
ency to some extent, but stabilize after 25 years of assimilation at a relatively high level of wel-
fare dependency. Due to these assimilation patterns along with the impact from the immigrants’ 
age at immigration, it is concluded that immigrants who arrive at young ages are more likely to 
be a “profitable” investment for the Danish society. Furthermore, the welfare dependency of im-
migrants from less developed countries is more sensitive to business cycle variations than that of 
natives and immigrants from developed countries. 
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Appendix A1. Public income transfers 
 
Income replacing public income transfers: 
Transfer Explanation  Characteristics 
Public pensions  Old-age pension, early retirement pension etc. Old-
age pension is paid to individuals aged more than 
65 years. Consists of 2 amounts. The base-payment 
(fixed amount paid to all who are entitled, i.e. 
above 65 years old) and a supplementary payment 
(means-tested).  
 
Universal, partly fixed amount 
and partly means-tested, infinite 
duration 
Pension paid to 
former civil ser-
vants 
Special labour market related pension paid to indi-
viduals who are formerly employed in the public 
sector as a civil servant. 
 
Entitlement requirements, fixed 
amount, infinite duration 
Public welfare  Different kinds of public welfare. 
 





Unemployment insurance benefits. Paid by the 
unemployment insurance organizations. 
 
Entitlement requirements, fixed 




Unemployment insurance benefits in case of illness 
etc. Paid by the local governments. 
 
Entitlement requirements, fixed 
amount, finite duration 
Education support 
(I) 
Financial support to people who undertake educa-
tion. Paid by the state. 
 
Entitlement requirements, fixed 
amount, finite duration 
Education support 
(II) 
Financial support to unemployed people who un-
dertake education. Paid by the unemployment in-
surance organizations. 
 
Entitlement requirements, fixed 




Financial support to individuals who start out as 
self-employed. 
 
Entitlement requirements, fixed 
amount, finite duration 
 
Other public income transfers: 
Transfer Explanation  Characteristics 
Child benefit  Quarterly subsidy paid to households with chil-
dren. Dependent on the number of children. 
 
Fixed amount, universal, condi-
tional of children’s age 
Public housing 
support 
Paid to individuals who live in rental housing. 
 
Means-tested, infinite duration Appendix A2. Further explanation and descriptive statistics for explanatory variables 
 
  Females    Males
  Natives    Immigrants  from
developed countries 
(DC) 
  Immigrants from less 
developed countries 
(LDC) 
Natives Immigrants  from
developed countries 
(DC) 
  Immigrants from less 
developed countries 
(LDC) 
Variable name  Explanation  Mean  Std.dev. Mean  Std.dev. Mean  Std.dev. Mean  Std.dev. Mean  Std.dev. Mean  Std.dev. 
                       
D1986  =1 if  year equals 1986 ; =0 otherwise  0.063  0.244  0.059  0.236  0.031  0.174  0.064  0.245  0.056  0.231  0.037  0.189 
D1987  =1 if  year equals 1987 ; =0 otherwise  0.064  0.245  0.059  0.236  0.035  0.184  0.064  0.245  0.058  0.233  0.043  0.204 
D1988  =1 if  year equals 1988 ; =0 otherwise  0.065  0.246  0.059  0.236  0.040  0.196  0.065  0.246  0.058  0.234  0.048  0.214 
D1989  =1 if  year equals 1989 ; =0 otherwise  0.065  0.247  0.060  0.238  0.045  0.207  0.065  0.247  0.059  0.236  0.052  0.223 
D1990  =1 if  year equals 1990 ; =0 otherwise  0.066  0.249  0.061  0.240  0.050  0.218  0.066  0.248  0.060  0.237  0.058  0.233 
D1991  =1 if  year equals 1991 ; =0 otherwise  0.067  0.250  0.062  0.241  0.056  0.230  0.067  0.249  0.061  0.239  0.062  0.242 
D1992  =1 if  year equals 1992 ; =0 otherwise  0.068  0.251  0.063  0.243  0.064  0.244  0.067  0.251  0.063  0.243  0.067  0.251 
D1993  =1 if  year equals 1993 ; =0 otherwise  0.068  0.252  0.064  0.245  0.071  0.256  0.068  0.251  0.065  0.246  0.073  0.260 
D1994  =1 if  year equals 1994 ; =0 otherwise  0.068  0.252  0.065  0.247  0.078  0.268  0.068  0.251  0.066  0.248  0.077  0.267 
D1995  =1 if  year equals 1995 ; =0 otherwise  0.068  0.252  0.067  0.250  0.084  0.278  0.068  0.252  0.068  0.252  0.082  0.274 
D1996  =1 if  year equals 1996 ; =0 otherwise  0.068  0.252  0.076  0.265  0.092  0.289  0.068  0.252  0.079  0.270  0.086  0.280 
D1997  =1 if  year equals 1997 ; =0 otherwise  0.068  0.253  0.080  0.271  0.100  0.300  0.069  0.253  0.083  0.276  0.090  0.286 
D1998  =1 if  year equals 1998 ; =0 otherwise  0.069  0.253  0.082  0.274  0.109  0.311  0.069  0.254  0.084  0.278  0.094  0.292 
D1999  =1 if  year equals 1999 ; =0 otherwise  0.069  0.253  0.083  0.276  0.118  0.323  0.069  0.253  0.085  0.279  0.099  0.299 
Single  =1 if  single ; =0 otherwise  0.247  0.432  0.271  0.444  0.185  0.388  0.295  0.456  0.309  0.462  0.322  0.467 
No. of Kids  The number of children in the household  0.890  0.999  0.876  1.033  1.758  1.477  0.785  0.992  0.757  0.999  1.287  1.459 
Mixed Househ.  =1 if  the household is “mixed” 
=0 otherwise 
0.018  0.133  0.513  0.500  0.190  0.392  0.016  0.126  0.473  0.499  0.154  0.361 
Individual U  The individual’s unemployment degree in the 
preceding year. Takes the values 0 -10 where 0 
indicates fully employed and 10 fully unem-
ployed 
0.869  2.160  1.096  2.495  1.856  3.120  0.664  1.894  1.088  2.493  2.126  3.284 
Ongoing Educ.  =1 if currently undertaking education 
=0 otherwise 
0.040  0.197  0.048  0.213  0.032  0.176  0.033  0.178  0.044  0.204  0.063  0.243 
EC12  =1 if  immigrant comes from EC12; =0 other-
wise 
    0.313  0.464          0.459  0.498     
Ex-Yugoslavia  =1 if  immigrant comes from Ex-Yugoslavia; 
=0 otherwise 
    0.118  0.323          0.139  0.346     
Other DC  =1 if  immigrant comes from other developed 
countries; =0 otherwise 
    0.241  0.427          0.189  0.391     
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Pakistan  =1 if  immigrant comes from Pakistan; =0 
otherwise 
        0.095  0.294          0.095  0.293 
Vietnam  =1 if  immigrant comes from Vietnam; =0 
otherwise 
        0.056  0.231          0.052  0.223 
Iran  =1 if  immigrant comes from Iran; =0 other-
wise 
        0.062  0.242          0.123  0.329 
Iraq  =1 if  immigrant comes from Iraq; =0 other-
wise 
        0.029  0.168          0.057  0.232 
No State  =1 if  immigrant comes from No state; =0 
otherwise 
        0.058  0.234          0.081  0.273 
Other LDC  =1 if  immigrant comes from other less 
developed countries; =0 otherwise 
Reference: Turkey 
        0.459  0.498          0.369  0.483 
Cohort 1970  =1 if  immigrant belongs to Cohort 1970; =0 
otherwise 
    0.233  0.423  0.285  0.451      0.244  0.429  0.216  0.412 
Cohort 1980  =1 if  immigrant belongs to Cohort 1980; =0 
otherwise 
    0.259  0.438  0.424  0.494      0.287  0.452  0.485  0.500 
Educ Danish  The years of Danish schooling  11.426  3.265  4.453  6.330  1.225  3.746  11.992  3.456  4.318  6.510  2.177  4.838 
Educ home  The years of home-country schooling (survey 
data) 
    3.929  6.097  3.236  5.313      3.547  6.001  2.962  5.337 
No response  =1 if asked to participate in the survey con-
cerning home-country schooling but chose 
not to respond  
=0 otherwise 
    0.224  0.417  0.427  0.495      0.264  0.441  0.378  0.485 
Not asked  =1 if not asked to participate in the survey 
concerning home-country schooling 
=0 otherwise 
    0.115  0.319  0.128  0.334      0.146  0.353  0.177  0.382 
U at entry  4.856  The national unemployment rate at immigra-
tion. Also referred to as U0
3.023  5.775  3.651  7.828  2.952  4.874  3.071  6.143  3.646  7.332  3.120 
Age at immig.  The immigrants’ age at immigration      1.790  1.448  2.463  0.944      1.990  1.430  2.198  1.101 
Age  Age  3.953  0.877          3.939  0.874         
Age30+  = (Age-30) if Age>30 ; = 0 otherwise  1.004  0.807          0.990  0.803         
Age35+  = (Age-35) if Age>35 ; = 0 otherwise  0.638  0.662          0.626  0.657         
Age40+  = (Age-40) if Age>40 ; = 0 otherwise  0.355  0.479          0.346  0.474         
Age45+  = (Age-45) if Age>45 ; = 0 otherwise  0.156  0.286          0.151  0.283         
YSM missing  =1 if YSM in not reported ; =0 otherwise      0.342  0.475  0.040  0.197      0.287  0.452  0.128  0.335 
YSM  Years since migration      0.659  0.740  0.926  0.652      0.692  0.731  0.826  0.657 
YSM5+  = (YSM-5) if YSM>5 ; = 0 otherwise      0.381  0.572  0.508  0.566      0.395  0.571  0.445  0.540 
YSM10+  = (YSM-10) if YSM>10 ; = 0 otherwise      0.195  0.390  0.238  0.400      0.200  0.389  0.200  0.372 
YSM15+  = (YSM-15) if YSM>15 ; = 0 otherwise      0.080  0.226  0.090  0.228      0.080  0.224  0.073  0.211 
  36YSM20+  = (YSM-20) if YSM>20 ; = 0 otherwise      0.022  0.100  0.022  0.094      0.022  0.097  0.018  0.088 
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Appendix A3.1. Estimation results from estimation of One-Limit Tobit Model. 
Natives and immigrants aged 25-57. 
Dependent variable: Amount of transfers received 
 
  Females  Males 
  Natives 
Immigrants from developed 
countries (DC) 
Immigrants from less  
developed countries (LDC) Natives 
Immigrants from developed 
countries (DC) 
Immigrants from less  
developed countries (LDC) 
  Coef.   Std.err.  Coef.  Std.err.  Coef.  Std.err.  Coef.  Std.err.  Coef.  Std.err.  Coef.  Std.err. 
D1986  -3995.0 **  625.9  -4610.3**  771.8 -12997.8** 1393.6 -6682.8**  885.7 -5518.0** 1075.2 -6409.6**  1191.4 
D1987  7586.6 **  617.1  7555.6**  762.8 11337.1** 1366.3 -1043.3   885.6 219.5   1076.6 7978.5**  1156.3 
D1988  12244.9 **  617.6  14125.5**  765.7 19944.3** 1355.1 -142.7   890.2 3550.6** 1082.4 9893.8**  1144.1 
D1989  14486.2 **  618.6  16496.4**  769.4 23869.5** 1359.2 2166.7**  893.9 5797.2** 1087.3 12893.7**  1137.2 
D1990  15265.3 **  621.2  17756.4**  775.0 26108.7** 1374.2 2023.3**  900.0 7049.9** 1098.2 12948.1**  1137.3 
D1991  16624.2 **  624.5  18592.0**  785.2 22302.0** 1404.4 7453.1**  901.9 11713.9** 1110.3 15360.1**  1148.4 
D1992  21594.6 **  626.1  23485.7**  793.7 29565.8** 1444.5 10622.3**  905.8 17445.7** 1121.2 19117.0**  1165.6 
D1993  24989.9 **  630.2  26160.3**  806.1 34343.4** 1495.1 12948.0**  914.1 19478.9** 1142.0 22192.2**  1191.7 
D1994  23407.9 **  637.5  28835.3**  821.6 44911.3** 1554.2 10781.4**  931.9 19418.8** 1172.1 31595.3**  1227.6 
D1995  22316.6 **  643.9  26466.5**  840.2 35496.5** 1621.6 9510.7**  944.5 16967.0** 1203.7 23236.4**  1270.1 
D1996  22595.4 **  651.6  28941.8**  849.7 36146.1** 1690.4 9975.8**  958.6 22269.8** 1218.4 24137.1**  1316.9 
D1997  21346.3 **  661.5  27211.1**  871.7 33642.3** 1762.5 9514.6**  974.0 19243.1** 1255.6 21159.2**  1366.8 
D1998  20131.8 **  672.8  21104.6**  900.0 28159.3** 1836.5 9106.3**  995.6 10703.2** 1305.6 13186.5**  1420.2 
D1999  18811.4 **  685.1  18154.9**  932.1 27385.7** 1908.6 4958.9**  1023.8 5607.5** 1362.0 14145.5**  1472.4 
Single  -7707.0 **  373.0  -19035.4**  608.7 -43601.8** 683.1 -30737.5**  532.3 -33803.7** 839.4 -59266.1**  537.4 
No. of Kids  14510.8 **  179.3  16284.9**  200.2 16125.7** 201.0 1939.2**  266.6 5917.8** 299.8 8852.3**  177.1 
Mixed Househ.  9452.3 **  1096.0  -10382.6**  592.7 -57344.5** 879.5 641.3   1832.9 -7761.6** 880.4 -43133.6**  747.9 
Individual U  6339.3 **  60.0  5826.7**  62.6 3880.8** 69.7 7806.1**  91.4 7092.1** 82.9 4996.3**  57.1 
Ongoing Educ.  16814.8 **  664.5  12267.2**  764.5 3952.7** 1185.2 24306.4**  1069.1 22133.7** 1134.4 13208.0**  794.0 
EC12             
           
           
           
           
           
  -6267.7**  609.1     -2090.6** 1059.7  
Ex-Yugoslavia    59903.1**  1035.4     70622.2** 1432.9  
Other DC    5200.1**  653.8     9026.8** 1228.2  
Pakistan      -3259.8** 1392.9     -20594.7**  1383.1 
Vietnam      9484.3** 1955.9     1855.6   1694.7 
Iran      35461.1** 1737.1     21582.5**  1488.1 Iraq             
           
           
     
     
     
     
     
     
           
           
           
           
           
     
     
     
     
     
     
    52691.8** 1745.1     36285.6**  1564.7 
No State      47947.1** 1488.8     36396.9**  1358.2 
Other LDC      -25.7   1081.4     -9627.3**  936.3 
Cohort 1970    10460.3**  1570.2 4141.7*  2363.8   33762.0** 2554.6 10036.0**  2124.8 
Cohort 1980    6341.2**  965.3 -12128.6** 1246.8   19841.7** 1391.9 -4405.7**  1152.7 
Educ Danish  -1664.2 **  57.4  -2436.0**  98.7 -3301.4** 140.3 -3858.6**  92.8 -5112.6** 168.8 -4000.7**  123.3 
Educ home    -2164.9**  103.7 -1241.7** 124.3   -4178.9** 170.8 -2288.2**  126.9 
No response    -24303.7**  1413.8 -9387.9** 1456.3   -46410.0** 2274.5 -23672.5**  1516.0 
Not asked    -38199.9**  1524.5 -17631.3** 1695.7   -76339.0** 2403.1 -36371.0**  1636.7 
U at entry  -158.3 **  72.1  49.2   164.9 200.3   221.1 -695.5**  147.0 1442.8** 268.4 1054.6**  231.4 
Age at immig.    77.7   433.9 -1560.2** 468.7   966.5*  585.2 1142.3**  465.8 
Age  -13917.9 **  1334.8      -19285.8**  1877.2    
Age30+  -173.6    2097.0      -8355.4**  2984.7    
Age35+  16869.4 **  1939.9      14220.5**  2870.7    
Age40+  -10885.0 **  1869.9      2361.0   2840.2    
Age45+  16846.7 **  1471.6      32674.3**  2201.3    
YSM missing    2819.7   2112.4 6187.8** 2854.3   2208.1   3140.6 -18692.5**  2630.0 
YSM    2022.4   2032.5 38030.6** 2260.7   -29972.9** 2631.0 -16319.2**  2090.2 
YSM5+    -12121.1**  2977.3 -49186.4** 3109.6   9764.1** 3859.5 -5143.7*  2926.8 
YSM10+    4825.6*  2648.1 -4131.8   2804.0   2469.0   3513.8 -769.8   2649.1 
YSM15+    -1753.2   2833.4 493.5   3251.3   3952.4   3877.1 392.0   3211.5 
YSM20+    6972.2**  3127.2 1583.8   3951.9   11876.2** 4460.1 18731.7**  3987.3 
Constant  69258.9 **  3878.1  33577.2**  2743.1 66144.4** 3307.0 112408.5**  5623.3 42281.0** 4669.2 103705.6**  3246.6 
σu 38606.2   156.2  41043.1  163.6 40501.6  232.5 47713.9  217.3 49800.9  244.6 39202.3  208.0 
σe 40109.4   85.2  44997.5  102.2 52367.4  127.0 53165.0  144.3 55574.3  157.2 54884.6  119.5 
ρ  0.481   0.002  0.454  0.002 0.374  0.003 0.446  0.002 0.445  0.002 0.338  0.002 
Log L  -1467289.1     -1362424.4    -1198876.5    -1033871.0    -973961.5    -1504281.2   
N  158777     144660    104183    165484    137597    143290   
Left-censored  39599     35204    7935    85440    62076    23728   
NOTE: ** indicates significance at a 5% level and * at a 10% level. 
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Appendix A3.2. Estimation results from estimation of Two-Limit Tobit. 
Natives and immigrants aged 25-57. 
Dependent variable: Welfare dependency rate rate based on welfare related benefits only (WDR3) 
 
  Females  Males 
  Natives 
Immigrants from developed 
countries (DC) 
Immigrants from less  
developed countries (LDC)  Natives 
Immigrants from developed 
countries (DC) 
Immigrants from less  
developed countries (LDC) 
  Coef.   Std.err.  Coef.  Std.err.  Coef.  Std.err.  Coef.  Std.err.  Coef.  Std.err.  Coef.  Std.err. 
D1986  -0.0214 **  0.0084  0.0022   0.0101 0.0084   0.0102 -0.0222*  0.0124 0.0004   0.0136 0.0590**  0.0097 
D1987  -0.0186 **  0.0084  -0.0020   0.0101 0.0287** 0.0100 0.0015   0.0125 0.0109   0.0137 0.0943**  0.0094 
D1988  -0.0086    0.0084  0.0077   0.0102 0.0636** 0.0099 -0.0019   0.0126 0.0487** 0.0136 0.0911**  0.0093 
D1989 
0.0016    0.0084  0.0218** 0.0102 0.0788** 0.0100 0.0326**  0.0124 0.0708** 0.0137 0.1119**  0.0092 
D1990  0.0136    0.0083  0.0174* 0.0102 0.0877** 0.0102 0.0517**  0.0124 0.0748** 0.0139 0.1215**  0.0092 
D1991  0.0218 **  0.0084  0.0170   0.0104 0.0927** 0.0105 0.0742**  0.0124 0.0601** 0.0142 0.1233**  0.0094 
D1992 
0.0379 **  0.0084  0.0249** 0.0105 0.1105** 0.0108 0.1251**  0.0123 0.0954** 0.0143 0.1676**  0.0095 
D1993  0.0457 **  0.0084  0.0179* 0.0108 0.1199** 0.0113 0.1314**  0.0124 0.1037** 0.0146 0.1949**  0.0097 
D1994 
0.0602 **  0.0085  0.0392** 0.0110 0.1699** 0.0118 0.1486**  0.0125 0.1160** 0.0150 0.2611**  0.0100 
D1995  0.0565 **  0.0086  0.0131   0.0113 0.1640** 0.0124 0.1468**  0.0127 0.0928** 0.0155 0.2563**  0.0104 
D1996 
0.0469 **  0.0088  0.0370** 0.0114 0.1711** 0.0131 0.1566**  0.0129 0.1318** 0.0157 0.2677**  0.0108 
D1997  0.0504 **  0.0089  0.0148   0.0118 0.1802** 0.0137 0.1863**  0.0131 0.1235** 0.0162 0.2806**  0.0112 
D1998  0.0123    0.0092  -0.0176   0.0122 0.1591** 0.0143 0.1286**  0.0136 0.0645** 0.0169 0.2424**  0.0116 
D1999  0.0165 *  0.0093  -0.0238* 0.0127 0.1794** 0.0149 0.1505**  0.0138 0.0725** 0.0177 0.2865**  0.0120 
Single 
0.3400 **  0.0043  0.2539** 0.0069 0.1568** 0.0045 0.1819**  0.0064 0.1368** 0.0087 -0.0466**  0.0038 
No. of Kids 
0.0234 **  0.0024  0.0208** 0.0026 0.0275** 0.0013 -0.0377**  0.0037 0.0042   0.0034 0.0248**  0.0013 
Mixed Househ. 
0.2198 **  0.0125  -0.1742** 0.0075 -0.3759** 0.0069 0.2326**  0.0221 -0.1427** 0.0098 -0.3040**  0.0057 
Individual U 
0.0099 **  0.0006  0.0068** 0.0007 -0.0040** 0.0005 0.0273**  0.0010 0.0175** 0.0009 -0.0001   0.0004 
Ongoing Educ. 
0.1189 **  0.0071  0.0381** 0.0089 -0.0505** 0.0076 0.1846**  0.0119 0.0992** 0.0118 -0.0310**  0.0056 
EC12 
     -0.0523** 0.0085 -0.1146** 0.0116  
Ex-Yugoslavia      0.5619** 0.0105 0.4610** 0.0141    41
*
Other DC 
     0.1025** 0.0094 0.1511** 0.0139  
Pakistan       0.0083   0.0097 0.0116   0.0102 
Vietnam       0.3410** 0.0131 0.2938**  0.0121 
Iran       0.4891** 0.0139 0.5330**  0.0118 
Iraq       0.5524** 0.0127 0.5309**  0.0110 
No State       0.5754** 0.0093 0.5336**  0.0094 
Other LDC      0.2042** 0.0079 0.1829**  0.0077 
Cohort 1970 
    -0.1019** 0.0211 0.0061   0.0203 -0.0486*  0.0277 0.0589**  0.0170 
Cohort 1980 
    -0.1067** 0.0128 -0.0214** 0.0092 -0.0595** 0.0162 0.0488**  0.0090 
Educ Danish 
-0.0377 **  0.0008  -0.0354** 0.0016 -0.0278** 0.0009 -0.0542**  0.0011 -0.0440** 0.0025 -0.0269**  0.0011 
Educ home 
    -0.0324** 0.0015 -0.0143** 0.0007 -0.0434** 0.0026 -0.0181**  0.0010 
No response 
    -0.3076** 0.0184 -0.0629** 0.0083 -0.4221** 0.0322 -0.1811**  0.0131 
Not asked 
     -0.2675** 0.0205 -0.0822** 0.0103 -0.3430** 0.0345 -0.1215**  0.0138 
U at entry 
-0.0033 **  0.0011  0.0136** 0.0021 0.0124** 0.0016 -0.0142**  0.0018 0.0266** 0.0029 0.0093**  0.0018 
Age at immig.      0.0010   0.0046 0.0089** 0.0036 -0.0083   0.0058 0.0159**  0.0037 
Age  -0.0705 **  0.0161  -0.1259**  0.0229  
Age30+  0.0120    0.0263  0.0489   0.0377  
Age35+  -0.0228    0.0260  -0.0962**  0.0380  
Age40+  -0.0174    0.0263  0.0070   0.0386  
Age45+  0.0382 *  0.0212  -0.0114   0.0313  
YSM missing 
    -0.4968** 0.0254 -0.3359** 0.0206 -0.6583** 0.0313 -0.6293**  0.0199 
YSM 
     -0.5414** 0.0219 -0.4091** 0.0148 -0.8071** 0.0275 -1.0082**  0.0149 
YSM5+ 
     0.3838** 0.0327 0.0740** 0.0195 0.5891** 0.0410 0.5895**  0.0205 
YSM10+ 
     0.1205** 0.0324 0.3288** 0.0190 0.2244** 0.0412 0.3502**  0.0198 
YSM15+       -0.0102   0.0369 0.1162** 0.0230 -0.0641   0.0477 0.1138**  0.0250 
YSM20+ 
     0.1255** 0.0414 -0.0945** 0.0280 0.1099*  0.0564 -0.0063   0.0311 Constant 
0.0374    0.0470  0.1611** 0.0340 0.0171   0.0228 0.2812**  0.0687 0.1737** 0.0472 0.3303**  0.0256 
σu 0.3195  0.0025  0.4229 0.0025 0.2897 0.0016 0.4377 0.0036 0.5122 0.0033 0.3298 0.0016 
σe 0.2814  0.0015  0.3618 0.0016 0.2880 0.0010 0.4068 0.0026 0.4616 0.0023 0.3471 0.0010 
ρ  0.5631  0.0038  0.5773 0.0029 0.5028 0.0028 0.5365 0.0038 0.5519 0.0031 0.4745 0.0024 
Log L  -26916.0     -47524.1 -40866.2 -35241.5 -55188.5 -73913.2  
N  158777     144660 104183 165484 137597 143290  
Left-censored  137883     108801 49676 146962 104516 66712  
Right-censored  692     3182 2332 1891 5439 7366  
NOTE: ** indicates significance at a 5% level and * at a 10% level. 
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